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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3921 
___________ 
 
MANUEL D. PEGUERO, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MR. MEYER, Unicor Correctional Office; UNICOR INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:11-cv-01476) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renée M. Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and for  
 Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 14, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 2, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Manuel Peguero, a federal prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his complaint by the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Because the appeal does not 
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present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
In 2005, Peguero allegedly experienced a work-related injury while working at the 
Unicor Recycling facility at FCI Fort Dix.  Specifically, Peguero asserts that he worked 
on a bailer machine and that other inmates were not prevented from breaking equipment 
located in the room next to the bailer.  According to him, the broken equipment emitted 
chemical fumes that caused damage to his eyes.  After he was transferred to USP 
Lewisburg, he was diagnosed with glaucoma.  He alleges that he did not have vision 
problems before his exposure to the fumes, and he asserts that he requires future surgery 
as well as treatment and medication for the rest of his life.  After events that are not 
relevant here, the District Court reopened Peguero‟s case but dismissed his complaint 
without prejudice.  Peguero then filed this appeal. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
1
 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court‟s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
                                              
1
 Generally, when a district court has dismissed a complaint without prejudice, the 
dismissal is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 unless the litigant cannot cure the 
defect or where the litigant declares an intention to stand on the complaint, whereupon 
the district court‟s order becomes final.  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 
(3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  Although the District Court did not explicitly consider the 
statute of limitations, as discussed in the text, Peguero‟s Eighth Amendment claim is 
time-barred, making the District Court‟s without-prejudice dismissal final.  See Fassett v. 
Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1157 (3d Cir. 1986).  The District Court also 
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F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may summarily affirm on any basis supported by the 
record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
“A Bivens action, which is the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action 
against state actors, will lie where the defendant has violated the plaintiff‟s rights under 
color of federal law.”  Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2001).  A 
Bivens claim, like a claim pursuant to § 1983, is “characterized as a personal-injury claim 
and thus is governed by the applicable state‟s statute of limitations for personal-injury 
claims.”  Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Cito v. 
Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep‟t, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Wilson v. 
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).  In New Jersey, personal injury claims are subject to a 
two-year statute of limitations.  See Dique, 603 F.3d at 185; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:14-2.  Accordingly, Peguero‟s Eighth Amendment claim is subject to this two-year 
period. 
                                                                                                                                                  
dismissed Peguero‟s claim for compensation under the Inmate Accident Compensation 
Act (“IACA”), 18 U.S.C. § 4126, without prejudice.  Peguero is scheduled to be released 
in February 2014 and cannot yet initiate his claim under IACA.  See 28 C.F.R. § 
301.303(a) (“No more than 45 days prior to the date of an inmate‟s release, but no less 
than 15 days prior to this date, each inmate who feels that a residual physical impairment 
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While state law provides the applicable statute of limitations, federal law controls 
when a Bivens claim accrues.  Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).  Accrual 
occurs “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.”  Id. (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Peguero‟s cause of action accrued in 2005, 
when he was allegedly injured by the defendants‟ deliberate indifference to safety 
procedures in the Unicor Recycling facility.  See William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 
646 F.3d 138, 150 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing accrual).  Therefore, the limitations period 
expired approximately four years before Peguero filed his complaint in 2011. 
Furthermore, we see no reason to toll the statute of limitations.  Unless 
inconsistent with federal law, state law governs the issue of whether a limitations period 
should be tolled.  Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985), superseded on other 
grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 1658; Dique, 603 F.3d at 185. In New Jersey, a statute of 
limitations may be tolled “until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of reasonable 
diligence and intelligence should have discovered, that he may have a basis for an 
actionable claim.”  Dique, 603 F.3d at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, 
Peguero‟s own allegations reveal that he was aware of his claim when his injury occurred 
in 2005.  Perhaps Peguero could argue that he did not discover the basis for his claim 
until he was diagnosed with glaucoma in 2007; however, even if this argument entitled 
him to tolling, the limitations period would have expired in 2009, two years before 
                                                                                                                                                  
exists as a result of an industrial institution, or other work-related injury shall submit [the 
appropriate form].”). 
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Peguero filed his complaint.  Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed his 
complaint for failure to state a claim.  
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.
2
  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
 
                                              
2
 The District Court did not provide Peguero leave to amend his complaint before 
dismissing it.  Nevertheless, we do not see how any amendment to his complaint would 
save his Eighth Amendment claim from being time-barred.  See Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
